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Introduction 
War, conscience and counsel in early modern Catholic Europe 
War has always troubled Christian consciences. Considerations of it bring out the tensions 
between the law of charity and the duty of obedience to secular authority and of reconciling 
the God of Hosts of the Old Testament with Christ’s rejection of the sword. It is no surprise 
that Augustine tried to square the circle. In his controversy with the Manicheans (Contra 
Faustum) he outlined what became the relevant framework in centuries to come.
1
 He 
maintained against them the importance for Christians of obedience to divine commands 
about the use of violence found in the Old Testament. The prerequisite was submission to 
divine or to duly constituted human authority. The second crucial question following from 
here was that of intention. Taking a man’s life was sinful if done from libido, i.e. love of 
violence, lustful revenge or greed for power. This finally linked intention to causes of war; 
they were limited to safeguarding the res publica and to establishing peace. Obedience to 
divine command, Augustine conceded, was less contentious than obeying ungodly rulers or 
unrighteous commands. Yet, by re-emphasizing the Christian duty of obedience, he managed 
to overcome this difficulty. Christians could fight wars and the Christian soldier fighting 
under the command of duly constituted authority, which according to Paul, was instituted by 
God, remained “innocent”.  
 Augustine had articulated the main coordinates of the discussion but debate would 
continue vigorously – and has never stopped – over the conditions under which rulers, the 
Church, and/or individual Christian could go to war. During the middle ages the question was 
seized by lawyers and canonists who merged it with the vocabulary of Roman law. The rise of 
scholasticism in the thirteenth century brought about a second theological benchmark in the 
form of the quaestio 40 (On war) in Aquinas’s IIa IIae.2 His attempt to synthesize 
Augustinianism, Aristotelianism, and aspects of canon law in quaestio format together with 
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his clear definition of analytical categories, shaped a conceptual web of bellum iustum that 
informed the debate well into the early modern period and well beyond the confessional 
divide.
3
 Crucially, the Thomist update of just war assimilated war to an act of “vindicative 
justice,”4 imposing defensive limitations on intention and causes. Such injections of legal and 
philosophical nature cannot be disconnected from the historical evolutions specific to Western 
Christianity. Indeed, war accompanied the rise of dynastic states and papal power as they 
rivaled and sometimes coalesced in the recovery of the legacy of the Roman Empire as well 
as in their ambition for empire over bodies and souls.  
Contemporary scholarship has certainly not neglected the study of the historical just 
war concepts for the medieval and early modern period; if anything it has been keen to link 
the pre-modern heritage to modern concepts of international law. This tendency may be 
regarded as a reflection of the heightened concern and public debate over just and unjust wars 
after the end of the Second World War which has led to soul-searching over their nature as 
well as to a quest for sources that might lend credibility, legitimacy, and justice to contentious 
political decisions.
5
 While this looking to the past to find solutions for the present has 
produced regular eruptions of publications in which studies of early modern authors have their 
place, there is no doubt that this very disposition often distorts the historical apprehension of 
“just war” within its original socio-political horizon and context. This problem has only partly 
been remedied by those who followed Quentin Skinner’s lead. The new intellectual history 
has hardly reshaped the canon and its understanding of context remains rather too narrowly 
focused on other “political” texts. Finally its criticism of the fiction of doctrinal coherence and 
the traditional re-posing of “eternal” questions has not prevented that other, not necessarily 
illegitimate, but nonetheless often anachronistic agendas such as the rise of “liberty” have 
been applied.
6
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The articles presented in this special issue reply to the challenge of contextualization 
of texts in two ways. One is horizontal, as a wide variety of texts and political practices are 
addressed in coherence. The other is vertical: the texts are woven into the traditions that 
constituted them. A context intellectual historians have not adequately taken into account in 
the analysis of early modern just war theories is their intellectual and institutional setting in 
the field of Catholic moral theology, which developed and established itself as an independent 
branch of theology only in the sixteenth century.
7
 In failing to do so, they have de-
contextualized some of its major exponents, separating them from their interlocutors with 
whom they were engaged in debates over the moral evaluation of human agency, as well as 
from the reasons why they were debating these problems. Placing the major and minor 
authors together back into the field of Catholic moral theology, however, shows that their 
conversations were not conducted in an ivory-tower, nor that they exclusively struggled over 
how to best advance the framework of international law, but that they were also responding to 
urgent practical, political, and pastoral queries.
8
  
Such queries gained traction as Tridentine Catholicism came to focus strongly on 
confession as a tool of reform and discipline, which was one of the main reasons why moral 
theology expanded so dynamically in the first place.
9
 While the Dominicans continued their 
long-standing tradition of commenting Aquinas, the Jesuits were the first to install proper 
university chairs of “moral theology”.10 The publishing output of the theologians, active in the 
field, was varied: one important genre was the manual for confessors in order to equip them 
with the adequate knowledge of how to examine the conscience of their flock. 
Groundbreaking here was the manual written by the Augustinian eremite Martín de 
Azpilcueta in 1552, who identified different kinds of possible sins according to social status 
and who drew up a list of “royal sins.”11 These were entirely political in nature and denounced 
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excessive taxation, arbitrary justice, and the conduct of unjust war. Azpilcueta’s manual 
remained a point of reference long into the seventeenth century, and it is therefore no 
coincidence that he is also mentioned throughout our articles. Manuals for confessors 
identified sins against the sacraments, the virtues, and increasingly against the Ten 
Commandments,
12
 but they did not explain how to evaluate them in confession. Such 
comprehensive understanding of moral agency was delivered in systematic volumes of moral 
theology. Displaying a permanent dialogue with pastoral concerns, they defined and explained 
the categories and principles of moral reasoning and how to apply them to all aspects of 
human life. 
Moral theologians believed not only that their discipline trumped all other more 
limited areas of science like law,
13
 but also that they were best placed to judge human agency 
ex post as well as to give moral counsel so as to contain sin ex ante. The counsel of 
theologians was therefore relevant to politics. The idea that the good monarch distinguished 
himself by listening to wide and informed counsel was certainly a long-standing feature of 
European political thought,
14
 yet the motivations for the reliance on theological counsel 
mainly, but not exclusively, in the Iberian sphere during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries
15
 are often misunderstood. Theological counsel was neither a mere fig-leave, nor did 
it amount to an unquestioned submission of politics to religion, or even the papacy, as many 
polemicists suspected. “Counsel of conscience” may instead be seen as a defense against 
direct Roman interference as well as against Machiavellian and reason of state arguments, 
according to which politics could never be moral. It undoubtedly sought to bring about the 
virtuous prince along new Counter-Reformation ideals,
16
 but one of its major driving forces 
was the Thomist understanding of conscience and sin that underpinned Catholic moral 
theology.  
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When early modern men asserted that something was a question of conscience, they 
generally referred to a rational negotiation before the tribunal of conscience. Synderesis as the 
habitual understanding of moral principles was distinguished from conscience as the act of 
rational application of knowledge to actions. Thus, in early modern parlance, conscience was 
understood as an act of judgment (dictamen), indeed an “actual and practical reasonable 
judgment.”17 This process was blurred by man’s inherent sinfulness as well as by the 
existence of conflicting norms; as Aquinas had realized, reason might sometimes “be 
mistaken in its reasoning.”18 Thus, to avoid and limit sinful “vincible” ignorance in decision-
making, it was necessary to examine one’s intentions and to seek competent enlightenment.  
Theologians generally recognized four types of conscience: recta, erronea, dubia, 
scrupulosa.
19
 True or correct conscience judged on the basis of a correct syllogism; it 
concluded in coherence with God’s will. Erroneous conscience was based on false syllogisms, 
reached false conclusions but was still convinced it was correct. The doubtful conscience was 
ambiguous and uncertain about correct reasoning; scrupulous conscience was doubtful and 
tortured. It was unable to judge, often inventing reasons and objections where none existed. 
Conscience, even when in error, was, however, absolutely binding on the individual. Moral 
theology therefore sought to provide tools that dispelled doubt and prevented mistakes in 
reasoning. Wise and authoritative counsel of theologians was meant to intervene just here and 
this task pushed theologians to discuss not just the rules of but also the traps in moral 
judgment. This is why the counsel of theologians was considered so vital for all and for rulers 
in particular. It helped to overcome sinful ignorance and to inform tenable judgments which 
need not, and this has to be emphasized, necessarily coincide with a specific theological 
opinion in order to be morally safe. 
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Against this backdrop our articles are therefore not concerned with presenting yet 
another loop in the discussion of just war “from Vitoria to Grotius,” or with drawing out how 
Catholic moral theology contributed to the development of natural rights or constitutionalism, 
but to examine how the debates on just war were entwined with practices and institutions of 
counsel that aimed to guide the conscience of subjects and rulers. In so doing, theologians 
engaged with four challenges: the Spanish conquest of the New World, humanists defying 
Augustinian and scholastic traditions, the confessional divide, and finally contemporary shifts 
in the understanding of conscience.  
The Spanish controversies on war and conquest have attracted wide scholarly attention 
and are also relevant to our own investigations. The Portuguese discussions, however, have 
been over-looked too often.
20
 Unjustly so, for Giuseppe Marcocci shows not only that they 
were acutely informed by other European debates, but also that the “board of conscience” 
(Mesa da Consciência) in which they took place represented a precursory institutional 
innovation. It protected the ruler’s conscience against papal interference while helping, more 
broadly, to create and shape the consciousness and conscience of empire. Vincenzo Lavenia 
draws attention to the most central of all peripheries of the “Spanish empire”, i.e. the Spanish 
Netherlands where long-lasting and large-scale warfare triggered logistic and disciplinarian 
concerns, and he shifts the focus from the interest in the ius ad bellum to the less studied ius 
in bello. The discipline of Christian soldiers was an increasingly problematic aspect of war 
which engaged its conduct as well as its justification. Rulers, generals, theologians, and 
chaplains thus cooperated in a disciplining effort targeting the soldier’s conscience along an 
agenda informed by moral theology and neo-stoicism. One of its practical outcomes was the 
subsequent development of moral and legal standards for the conduct of soldiers in canon law 
which now discerned, probably for the first time, the “sins and crimes of war”, laying the 
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foundations of notions of military justice. The shadow of Spanish hegemony also lingers in 
my own contribution. Spain haunted not only the battlefields within and without Europe; the 
superpower of the early modern age also presented a controversial intellectual challenge to 
France, its most important rival. The French debate on just war was essentially polemical and 
anti-Spanish, which explains the increasingly fierce rejection of scholastic just war concepts 
and associated ideas of theological counsel.  
The Spanish debate over the legitimacy of conquest of the Americas was by and large 
conducted within the framework of the just war tradition and it gave rise to the remarkable 
revival and re-interpretation of Thomist concepts in the wake of Francisco de Vitoria’s 
lectures.
21
 The neo-scholastic theologians who favored natural law arguments over the 
medieval canonist tradition in their examination of war were, however, challenged at various 
junctures as Spain’s experience criss-crossed with humanist readings and appraisals of Roman 
history. The Roman lens led humanists to strip the “law of war” of Augustine’s prohibition of 
libido. In their view, the “authority of the Romans” instead clearly suggested the legitimacy of 
conquest for the aggrandizement of empire. As Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda stated – whatever the 
theologians believed – the pursuit of power and glory was laudable and not to be despised.22 
Machiavelli deepened this challenge by resuscitating the pagan accusation – famously 
rejected by St Augustine in City of God – that Christianity was responsible for the demise of 
the Roman Empire because its moral regime undermined military and political virtue.
23
 Yet, 
despite such fundamental criticism of the pillar of Christian tradition, Machiavelli believed 
that the religion of the Romans largely explained their military prowess, a point even the 
enemies of the Florentine secretary found difficult to dismiss.
24
 The right kind of religion 
therefore was arguably the cornerstone of formidably disciplined armies capable of defending 
the state and of empire-building. Paradoxically this might well have been a Machiavellian 
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lesson assimilated by otherwise unsympathetic theologians, as Vincenzo Lavenia shows in his 
discussion of how military chaplains attempted to discipline the soldiers’ consciences. 
Giuseppe Marcocci demonstrates as well that the disciplining of conscience was an important 
tool of empire-building in the Portuguese case and it brought about an extraordinary 
flourishing of new casuistry which oriented and shaped imperial politics.  
The humanist comparison of their own circumstances to Rome’s religious-military 
complex yielded another interesting insight: the Romans had not fought religious wars.
25
 This 
observation opened the possibility of reconciling the opponents in the scholastic-humanist 
divide since the second scholastics agreed generally that religion did not count as a just cause 
of war. On a contrary line, however, some humanists, in the name of the res publica 
Christiana, returned to the canonist legacy of holy war which scholastics largely rejected.
26
 
The amalgam of humanism and legacy of the crusades was nourished further by scriptural 
studies of the Old Testament. The result was an explosive cocktail that fuelled an early 
modern renewal of holy war concepts particularly in France, England and the Holy Roman 
Empire.
27
 Within this myriad of humanist approaches, Erasmus’s pacifism, the outcome of his 
humanist critique of humanism, seems isolated and it appears to have generated only limited 
following. Yet, there were some long-term off-shoots, generally in neo-stoic garb and often in 
Jesuit cloak. Their traces can be discerned throughout our contributions.             
 José Fernández-Santamaria was certainly right to point out that Erasmus’s peculiar 
approach to war was due to the fact that he never “took the momentous step marking the 
appearance of the modern state.”28 This led him to believe that the problem of war might be 
solved by creating virtuous rulers who based their decisions on the Gospel. Yet the reason 
why it was impossible to leave the decision to go to war to the virtuous individual cannot be 
explained solely by the fact that neo-scholastic theologians with their grasp of the state 
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submitted such questions to natural law. Nor did it solely follow from the idea that good 
kingship had to rely on taking wide-ranging and wise counsel. To understand how just war 
and politics in general were conceptualized in early modern Europe, it is necessary to link – 
and to emphasize – the notions of conscience and counsel.  
The “early modern conscience” has received intense scholarly attention over the past 
thirty years leading to a new appreciation of moral theology among historians who want to 
unlock the intellectual and ideological contexts of the confessional age.
29
 As has been shown, 
the understanding of conscience in terms of a judgment (dictamen) promoted its 
externalization in institutions, some of which are explored here, as well as the inquiry into the 
methods of appraising moral arguments. The parallel emergence in the sixteenth century of 
probabilism is therefore no coincidence and it boosted and expanded the debate amongst 
moral theologians. Contrary to what critics claimed, the aim of probabilism was not to “relax” 
moral standards, but to provide knowledge for theologians engaged in counsel and pastoral 
care.
30
 Individuals were not expected to solve the complicated questions themselves, but to 
follow a probable opinion, which might well be somebody else’s opinion endorsed by 
theological authority. Basically an identical moral act was to be judged differently if the 
person who accomplished it did so in doubt and uncertainty (mortal sin), or whether he 
performed the act after searching a probable opinion through good counsel.
31
  
Jean-Pascal Gay and Jean-Louis Quantin emphasize that probabilism was essentially 
an “extrinsicism” because its fundamental technique relied on “deposing one’s conscience” in 
favor of theological authority.
32
 The individual soldier, for instance, was not required to judge 
the ius ad bellum; he might follow authority. However, the soldier’s conscience was engaged 
in all matters regarding his conduct on the battlefield. He was supposed to seek the guidance 
of priests, who helped him to depose his troubled conscience with their advice. The ruler’s 
10 
 
conscience in turn was morally safe if he had sought adequate counsel, and ideally, so the 
theologians believed, this too amounted to deposing his conscience to them. Finally, through 
the sacrament of penance both rulers and subjects were submitted to their confessors who 
acted as judges and physicians of the interior forum. Vincenzo Lavenia highlights how 
relevant this framework was for the development of pastoral care for soldiers, while my 
contribution explores how controversial such notions were in the French political context. 
Although probabilism did not stabilize the authority of theologians as a matter of logical 
necessity, early modern Catholic confessional culture understood it this way. By consequence 
the enemies of probabilism, who gained momentum from the middle of the seventeenth 
century onwards, generally did not criticize its excessive subjectivism. Rigorists questioned 
its disregard for “Truth”, while “probabiliorists” chastised it for not resolving the question of 
subjective assent to the adopted opinion. Both these schools attacked it for making obedience 
a purely exterior adhesion to authority. The collapse of the probabilist framework in the 
seventeenth century therefore contributed not only to the rise of subjectivist understandings of 
conscience but also to the crisis of the exteriorized institutions of conscience which the 
contributions in this volume explore. We hope that our analyses of how the relations among 
war, conscience and counsel were configured before this juncture provide insight into the 
mechanisms that determined early modern understandings of the State and of man.  
Nicole Reinhardt  
University of Durham/UK) 
                                                          
The articles presented in this special issue are the outcome of a workshop held in May 2012 at the Max-Weber-
Center Erfurt on “Politics and Conscience in Early Modern Europe”. I would like to thank the members of the 
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